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INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS AND 
THE MACROECONOMICS OF CAPITAL ACCOUNT OPENING 
Since the early 1990s, Latin American countries have experienced large capital inflows. These 
have contributed to short term economic reactivation, by releasing the binding external constraint 
that prevailed during the 1980s. The policy challenge is making this benefit consistent with longer 
term effects on savings and investment geared to economic growth. The experience of the 1970s 
was that short-sighted policies led to exchange-rate appreciation, to crowded-out domestic savings 
and to bubbles in assets markets. The present episode is examined, particularly analyzing cases 
with different doses of intervention in three markets: capital flows, money and foreign-exchange. A 
comparative analysis of the cases of Argentina, Colombia, Chile and México shows that the policy 
mix affects substantially the feasibility of simultaneously achieving stability of the exchange-rate 
and of monetary aggregates, improvement of competitiveness via better and larger allocation of 
resources to investment, and enhancing the sustainability of capital inflows. 
INTRODUCTION 
Both a shortage and an abundance of external funds pose 
challenges to economic policy. This paper analyses how to improve 
the capacity to absorb external savings so that they can help to 
strengthen productive development, improve competitiveness in both 
the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors, consolidate the balance of 
payments and encourage macroeconomic policies that promote 
investment and increased productivity. Unless increases in foreign 
capital flows are obtained together with some degree of Government 
control over currency and monetary variables, there is little 
chance that macroeconomic policy will contribute to an efficient 
allocation of foreign resources. Policies adopted by different 
Latin American countries will be examined, bearing in mind the 
effects that the interrelation between financial and macroeconomic 
dimensions has on the generation of savings and their 
intermediation to strengthen the regional economies' linkages with 
international markets as well as their productive capacity. 
In section I, the magnitude of current capital flows is 
examined. In section II, three areas of Government intervention are 
discussed: a first level in the foreign-exchange market, a second 
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level in the monetary market and a third level directly on capital 
flows. Within that framework, the experiences of Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico and Colombia are assessed in section III. The paper 
concludes with some policy recommendations. 
I. LESSONS FROM RECENT BOOMS IN INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
Since the early 1990s, several Latin American countries have 
received large net flows of external capital. In 1992 alone, the 
net flow peaked at US$ 59 billion and for 1993 it was estimated to 
reach US$ 64 billion. The net entry of capital represented 5% of 
GDP in 1992 and 1993. This compares with a coefficient of 4.6% in 
1981 (see table 1) and only 1.2% in 1983-89. 
Large capital inflows, combined with lower interest payments 
on the external debt, led to the region recording a net positive 
transfer of resources for the first time since the beginning of the 
debt crisis. In 1991, in fact, the transfer became positive again, 
with a value of US$ 8 billion. In 1992, it rose to US$ 33 billion, 
and for 1993 it was estimated at US$ 26 billion. The positive 
transfer in these last two years averaged 2.3% of regional GDP, as 
compared with an average negative figure of 3.7% in 1983-1989 (see 
table 2) . 
It is important that external capital should complement —and 
not replace— the domestic savings effort, because the later is 
decisive in reaching the required level of investment to achieve 
the region's challenge of changing production patterns with social 
equity (ECLAC, 1990; 1992).1 When there are large-scale capital 
inflows into a country's economy, two different effects can occur. 
The first is Keynesian in nature and is reflected in greater 
effective demand within a context of underutilization of productive 
capacity. The second type of effect is that capital inflows 
contribute to savings and, whenever efficiently transformed into 
investment, can positively affect domestic productive capacity. 
However, when this process takes place, there are also 
significant financial effects which occur as the result of changes 
Figure 1 shows those factors which make national savings efforts as a 
percentage of GDP decline when measured at constant prices, in response to 
external shocks such as the negative effect of terms of trade and the net factor 
payments abroad; one must bear in mind that such an indicator of savings might 
not be the best because the terms-of-trade effect and net factor payments abroad 
are more properly income transfers rather than changes in savings. Thus an 
alternative indicator may measure national savings at current prices, as figure 
2 shows. See Held and Uthcff (1994) . 
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in relative prices. During the early stages of a process of strong 
increases in capital inflows, there is a tendency towards 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Efforts at sterilizing the 
monetary effects of foreign-currency operations pressures upward 
the real interest rate, which, in turn, encourages both additional 
inflows and an exchange-rate appreciation (the so-called "Dutch 
disease"). The significant real exchange-rate appreciations 
observed in the 1976-1981 period were also associated with the use 
of the exchange rate as a stabilization tool in various Latin 
American countries. 
The experience of the region during the bank-lending boom of 
1976-1981 shows that it failed to create the conditions for a 
sustainable flow of capital, in a context of macroeconomic 
stability and enhancement of the savings and investment process. 
The excess expenditure, of about 4 percentage points of GDP, 
observed during 1976-81, was accompanied in some countries of the 
region, particularly Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, by large 
financial "bubbles" of a speculative nature as the result of excess 
domestic credit.2 The value of domestic financial and property 
assets grew at rates notably greater than those of output and 
income, and real interest rates were kept above the levels observed 
in international markets (Akyiiz, 1993) . 
The financial bubbles were due basically to two factors: 
i) large capital inflows (stimulated by the oversupply of 
international credit), and ii) the corresponding exchange rate 
overvaluation sustained by these flows. The severe problems faced 
by the domestic financial systems during the debt crisis show that 
these factors were not sustainable over time (Ramos, 1986; Corbo 
and De Melo, 1987). The required adjustment implied an intense 
recessive cycle, as these countries that had accommodated their 
economies to a large capital inflow were forced to face the changes 
in the conditions underlying the international financial and 
commercial markets (Ffrench-Davis and Devlin, 1993) . 
The experience of the region in the last decade and a half 
provides valuable lessons on the way a relative abundance of 
capital flows brings about exchange-rate appreciations and 
aggregate-expenditure increases, which may become inconsistent with 
medium- and long-term objectives. The authorities must base their 
decisions on four major objectives: i) to achieve stable capital 
flows; ii) to sustain a competitive exchange rate; iii) to ensure 
the stability of monetary aggregates and prices; and iv) to promote 
2 At that time, the main characteristic was the appearance of a domestic 
credit bubble within a non-regulated banking sector. These countries were 
pioneers within the region in the area of deregulation and liberalization of 
domestic financial markets. Various kinds of supervision and regulation of the 
commercial banks were implemented after the debt and financial crises of the 
early 1980s (Held, 1993). 
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savings, channelling them towards investment in sectors which 
strengthen the competitiveness of the domestic economy (Reisen, 
1993). The absorption of external savings must not discourage 
national savings and production of tradables, so as to achieve the 
level of investment required by long-term growth; and the measures 
adopted for managing the balance of payments (exchange-rate policy 
and regulation of short-term movements) must not discourage 
unnecessarily the inflows of long-term capital. 
II. THREE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
The recovered access to capital inflows has had several 
effects on the recipient economies: it allowed for an increase of 
international reserves to more adequate levels and a recovery of 
economic activity. As a result of the negative experience of the 
1970s, the countries have adopted a more conservative position with 
regard to the proportion of capital flows that are immediately 
channelled towards financing the balance-of-payments current 
account deficit. This has meant that in the 1992-93 period, the 
countries of the region devoted only 69% of these inflows to the 
financing of the deficit (use of external savings), i.e., 
US$ 40 billion annually; this percentage reached 100% in 1980-81 
(see table 3). The entry of capital has also had a positive effect 
by allowing for an increase in the rate of use of existing 
productive capacity, with the consequent recovery of output, income 
and employment.3 The lifting of the external constraint at the 
beginning of the 1990s has allowed the recovery of economic growth, 
whose annual rate increased from 1.8% between 1983 and 1989 to more 
than 3% between 1990 and 1993, without a significant increase in 
investment. 
But, on average, it also posted some warnings. During this 
same period: (i) the share of imports in GDP increased more than 
that of exports; (ii) domestic expenditure rose faster than output 
or income, while the surplus in the non-financial current account 
and the total balance of payments was reduced —which is equivalent 
to an increase in the use of external savings; and (iii) national 
savings were crowded out by external savings, which is reflected in 
the fact that the increase in total investment was less than the 
By recovery, we are referring to the fact that the external constraint 
under which the regional economies were operating did not allow them to make use 
of their production capacity. Once the frontier of production over the short term 
has been reached, the prospects of continued growth of GDP depend on additional 
savings and investment efforts and improvements in productivity. 
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increase in external savings.4 These outcomes are the result of 
both the adjustment of economies to the relaxation of 
foreign-exchange constraints, as well as to economic policy-induced 
objectives, especially with regard to foreign-exchange and 
interest-rate policies. 
In order to keep some control over these prices, an initial 
level of intervention arises in the foreign-exchange market. What 
is implicit in this type of intervention is the concern to moderate 
the tendencies towards excessive appreciation of the real exchange 
rate, since this has become one of the main instruments for the 
promotion of exports.5 This role has become more crucial as a 
result of the coexistence of trade liberalization processes and 
renewed access to international capital markets. Changes in 
reserves record official sales and purchases of foreign exchange 
and show the extent to which the central bank intervenes in the 
foreign-exchange market. This intervention is aimed at providing 
stability and credibility to exchange-rate policy. 
At this first level of intervention, two very different 
situations may be distinguished, depending on the responses which 
central banks give to increases in capital inflows. One response is 
not to intervene at this first level. In this case, the capital 
flows would not bring about changes in the international assets 
held by central banks, and the totality of increased inflows would 
exert pressure on the foreign-exchange market, pressing for a 
revaluation. Thus the inflow is directed to financing a net 
increase in imports. 
The other response is to intervene, accumulating reserves. In 
the extreme case, if the monetary authorities intervene actively 
and buy all the foreign exchange brought in by the capital inflows, 
the increase in the balance of the capital account will be equal to 
the increase in the official reserves. In this case, the 
sterilization of these resources implies that the central bank is 
preventing their use to finance a deficit on current account, and 
thus avoiding their being channelled in the form of external 
savings towards the domestic market. This first level sterilization 
of the effects on the foreign-exchange market has repercussions on 
4 Something similar occurred during the gestation of the debt crisis. 
However, at that time, the reduction in national savings responded to a marked 
expansion of consumption, while now it is the result of a decline in income 
brought about by deteriorations in the terms of trade. In 1990-92, this loss 
represented 5.7% of GDP in 1980 dollars, while external savings represented 2% 
of GDP. In 1976-81 the loss due to the terms of trade was 0.8% of GDP and 
external savings were 3.9%. 
5 This has not always been the criterion followed. In some cases, in a 
context of increasing capital inflows and relatively high inflation rates, the 
exchange-rate policy has served anti-inflationary purposes. 
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the monetary market.6 In this situation it must be decided whether 
or not to sterilize the monetary effects of the accumulation of 
reserves, which, in fact, influence the degree of liquidity of the 
economy, through an increase in the money supply. At this second 
level, the intervention implies a choice between an active or 
passive monetary policy (in terms of handling aggregate demand) and 
its relationship with macroeconomic stabilization. If the domestic 
economy is close to full capacity, the central bank must try to 
sterilize the monetary effects of foreign-exchange operations, in 
order to maintain the real value of the exchange rate and 
sustainable macroeconomic balances. 
As a last resource, the countries can always consider revising 
the nature of the opening of the capital account, with a view to 
regulating the composition of the inflows so as to make them more 
compatible with the objectives of national development. There now 
appears a third level of intervention (Calvo, Leiderman and 
Reinhart, 1993; World Bank, 1993). Most of the countries have 
chosen to open up the capital account. However, several of them 
have established intervention mechanisms aimed at discouraging 
inflows of speculative capital and short-term funding that does not 
necessarily contribute to productive investment. 
The possible combinations between the first and second levels 
yield different mixes of exchange-rate and monetary policy, which 
allows for distinguishing two major intervention alternatives. The 
first, favoured by the countries that have chosen to maintain a 
passive monetary policy, is that which is known as non-sterilized 
intervention; it consists in accumulating substantial international 
reserves, since the central bank buys the foreign exchange brought 
in by capital flows in exchange for national currency, without 
sterilizing the monetary effect of these operations, under a 
controlled exchange-rate system.7 An appreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate is thus avoided; however, if the adjustment by way of 
increasing imports does not occur fast enough, this alternative can 
expand the monetary base beyond the desired point. This may be 
reflected in inflationary pressures, causing appreciations in the 
real exchange rate and tendencies towards excesses and changes in 
the composition of expenditure. 
In order to finance the accumulation of reserves, the central bank may 
draw on national savings. However, the absolute level of national savings is not 
affected but there is a change in the portfolio composition. This change may 
reflect the use of public savings and/or social-security savings in order to 
compensate for the weakness of the financial markets in the region to meet the 
needs for open market operations (Reisen, 1993) . This involves public-sector 
savings and fiscal discipline. 
7 The range of usual forms extends from the fixation of a nominal exchange 
rate and mobile parity to free flotation between pre-established bands. The 
extreme case, when a nominal exchange rate is fixed and no sterilization is 
performed, is equivalent to the monetary approach to the balance of payments. 
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The second alternative, adopted by those countries which, 
together with defending the exchange rate, have opted for active 
monetary policies, is known as sterilized intervention. Like 
non-sterilized intervention, it involves accumulating reserves, 
pari passu with sterilization of the monetary effects of these 
operations. The purpose is to isolate the money stock from 
fluctuations stemming from foreign-capital mobility. This type of 
sterilization, if effective, prevents domestic real interest rates 
from falling. In economies that are making full use of their 
installed capacity, this has the advantage of helping control 
aggregate spending and preventing further appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. However, with this option, if interest rate spreads 
persist, capital inflows continue to be stimulated, generating 
further needs for sterilization, while at the same time the 
intervention may be a source of quasi-fiscal deficits, since the 
central bank is placing commercial paper in the domestic market at 
higher interest rates than those it obtains on its international 
reserves. 
The sterilized intervention alternative is not problem free. 
Conflicts arise mainly when there is too little flexibility in 
fiscal policy to allow national economic authorities to use this 
policy to offset domestic or external shocks.8 In these cases the 
Government is deprived of additional policy instruments and hence 
cannot use fiscal tools to moderate aggregate spending or stimulate 
the economy, but must rely solely on monetary and exchange-rate 
instruments. A more flexible tax system allows for a better policy 
mix and more stable interest and exchange rates. 
In the absence of a flexible fiscal policy, the problems of 
sterilized intervention arise from the dilemma confronting the 
economic authorities when they try to control, simultaneously, the 
real interest rate (as an instrument of monetary policy for 
implementing stabilization policies) and the real exchange rate (as 
an instrument of trade policy for promoting the production of 
tradables). If an interest rate consistent with anti-inflationary 
objectives (by sterilizing the monetary effects of accumulating 
reserves) is higher than the international rate adjusted by 
devaluation expectations, then capital inflows will continue to 
exert pressure towards appreciation of the real exchange rate. This 
would run counter to the objective of protecting the tradable's 
sector. If, on the contrary, the domestic interest rate is allowed 
to fall, then both objectives are jeopardized. The higher 
expenditure induced by lower interest rates will exert pressure on 
prices of non-tradables and also will lead to an overvaluation of 
the real exchange rate (Zahler, 1992). 
8 What happens today is that, in most of the democracies of the region (and 
of the world), legislative approval is required in order to change the tax 
system, while monetary policy depends solely on decisions of the central bank 
and/or ministry of finance. 
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For this reason, in practice, the alternative of sterilized 
intervention has been combined with other policy measures, in order 
to: i) influence the exchange market, at the first level of 
intervention; ii) regulate aggregate demand through mechanisms 
other than the interest rate, at the second level of intervention; 
and iii) modify the level and composition of capital flows, either 
directly, through restrictions and charges directed particularly at 
short-term capital, or indirectly, by generating exchange-rate 
uncertainty, at the third level of intervention. 
Non-sterilized intervention has been frequently adopted by 
countries which favour price stability as an objective of economic 
policy; the extreme situation relates to the monetary approach to 
the balance of payments. It is a strategy which involves direct 
action to cope with inflation and indirect action to affect the 
real exchange rate. In establishing this mechanism, it is hopsd 
that both the domestic interest rate and the inflation rate will 
converge rapidly with their international counterparts. 
An important part of the success of this strategy will 
ultimately depend on the confidence of the economic agents in the 
economic authorities' capacity to maintain a fixed nominal rate of 
exchange and on the relationship between the nominal exchange rate 
and inflation. In the face of substantial lags9 in the inflationary 
dynamic, using the nominal exchange rate as an anchor to stabilize 
prices can cause marked currency appreciations, with their 
corresponding effects on other relative prices, the allocation of 
resources and macroeconomic equilibria. In the final analysis, if 
this trend persists and prices do not adapt, the authorities must 
be prepared to make adjustments in economic activity whenever the 
real exchange rate deviates very significantly from its long-term 
value. 
Sterilized intervention has been preferred by countries which 
have maintained an active monetary policy and a more cautious 
position as regards the sustainability of capital flows. This 
presupposes a concern for the continued development of the 
tradables sector, the generation of national income and its 
channelling towards saving and investment in that sector. 
This refers to the element of inertia which tends to impede the abrupt 
reduction in the rate of inflation. This component is a function of the degree 
of formal and informal indexation of the economy and must be considered in 
designing an exchange-rate policy for the purposes of price-level stabilization. 
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III. SOME COUNTRIES EXPERIENCES 
While in practice the countries have used different policy 
mixes, Argentina is one of the countries that have come the closest 
to non-sterilized intervention, starting from high levels of 
inflation and placing priority on price stabilization efforts. 
Among the countries that have used the option of active 
intervention, Chile has done so most persistently. But Colombia and 
Mexico can also be mentioned; all three are discussed below. 
1. One case of non-sterilized intervention: Argentina 
Argentina has adopted a series of measures designed to 
deregulate capital movements. With regard to the operation of the 
foreign-exchange market, the Convertibility Act promulgated in 
March 1991 (which fixed the nominal exchange rate with a parity of 
one-to-one with the dollar and established legal validity to 
contracts denominated in different currencies) allowed for a total 
deregulation of this market. The explicit objective of this Act was 
to create the conditions for applying the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments, in an attempt to sharply reduce the 
inflationary process and to ensure the stability of the nominal 
exchange rate (Argentina, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Public 
Works and Services, 1993; Fanelli and Machinea, 1994). Other 
measures adopted to stimulate capital movements are the Economic 
Emergency Act (August 1989), establishing equality of treatment for 
foreign and national capital; Tax Amnesty Act (April 1992); 
deregulation of financial and securities markets; and, finally, 
public-sector reforms, which have had an important effect on 
capital movements, in particular, the State Reform Act, which 
established the processes for the privatization of public 
enterprises and debt-conversion schemes. 
In September 1992 and within the second level of intervention, 
Argentina amended the constitution of the Central Bank. Some of the 
main reforms were: establishment of the independence of the Central 
Bank, prohibition of monetary financing of the public deficit and 
elimination of the State guarantee of deposits. With these reforms, 
the authorities sought to strengthen the credibility of the 
permanence over time of monetary stability and the convertibility 
of the currency (Argentina, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Public 
Works and Services, 1993; Fanelli and Machinea, 1994). In the 
absence of mechanisms to sterilize the effects of exchange-rate 
operations, the increase in the international reserves10 has 
brought about in a first stage a steep rise in the degree of 
monetization of the economy (from the low levels observed after the 
10 Measured in import months, the reserves reached the equivalent of 11 and 
nine months in 1991 and 1992, respectively. In 1989, they were of the order of 
four months of imports. 
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hyperinflation recorded in 1989) ; this situation, together with the 
expansion of internal credit, increased aggregate demand and 
economic activity during 1991-1993. The greater use of external 
savings for imports financing has operated as a monetary buffer. 
2. Three cases of sterilized intervention 
a) The case of Chile. Since before the debt crisis, Chile has 
been taking action in fields related to capital movements.11 After 
1990, the authorities hau to adopt measures to regulate their entry 
and to sterilize the monetary effects of the accumulation of 
reserves, through interventions in the foreign exchange and money 
markets. Chile used basically three instruments for these purposes: 
a "dirty" floating of the exchange rate, around a benchmark value 
determined on the basis of a basket of currencies; the 
sterilization of the monetary effects of the accumulation of 
reserves through open-market operations, and the application of 
charges and reserve requirements on capital inflows to regulate and 
to discourage excessive flows, mainly over the short term. 
Chile's exchange rate policy has undergone significant changes 
in recent times. In 1983, it adopted again a crawling-peg policy, 
which consisted in determining a benchmark price for the dollar 
(dollar fixed by the Central Bank). This was devalued daily by the 
Central Bank on the basis of net inflation (domestic/external 
differential). Similarly, in order to allow the short-run market a 
certain role, the exchange rate was allowed to float within a band 
around the value of the official rate. In mid-1989, this band was 
fixed at ± 5% of this price. 
After 1990, the official exchange rate was repeatedly located 
close to the lower limit of the band, requiring the Central Bank to 
intervene; it thus acquired US$ 1.5 billion in 1990 and US$ 3 
billion in 1991. It also carried out numerous open-market 
operations to sterilize the monetary effect of foreign-exchange 
operations. By that time the authorities considered that some of 
the factors which contributed to the positive evolution of the 
current and capital accounts were more permanent and thus proceeded 
to accommodate these tendencies through successive additional 
measures: i) a revaluation of 2%, in June 1991, supplemented by a 
reduction in customs tariffs of 15% to 11%; ii) in January 1992, 
there was a new revaluation of 5%. However, it was also thought 
that a significant part of inflows was of a temporary nature. Thus 
Decree Law 600 of 1974 on foreign investment eliminated legal 
discrimination against foreign investors; chapters XVIII and XIX authorized 
conversion operations for external debt for both Chileans and foreigners; in 
1989, Chile authorized the issue of portfolio securities to various enterprises 
for sale on foreign securities markets (Fondos de Inversion chilenos); in 1990, 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) were approved as an alternative to the direct 
issue of shares and debt instruments by Chilean enterprises in the United States 
(Ffrench-Davis, Agosin and Uthoff, 1994) . 
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later in 1992, the floating band was widened from 5% to 10% of the 
official rate, in order to generate more uncertainty in the 
formation of short-term expectations. The above arrangements were 
supplemented in March 1992 when the Central Bank decided to 
intervene discretionally within the limits of the band, formally 
initiating a "dirty floating"; and in July 1992, the exchange-rate 
regulations were modified in order to reduce the linkage of 
monetary policy with that of the United States and to associate it 
more closely with that of Chile's other main commercial partners. 
With this proposal, the agreed exchange rate was pegged to a basket 
of currencies, made up of the United States dollar (50%) , the 
German mark (30%) and the Japanese yen (20%) , weighting which 
reflect the different monetary areas in Chile's trade. 
But also some measures to stop capital inflows were taken to 
increase the cost of international transactions: i) in 1991, a 
reserve requirement of 20% and a tax of 1.2% on short-term external 
credits were established, and ii) in May 1992, the reserve 
requirement was raised to 30%. This set of policies has allowed 
Chile to notably soften revaluating pressures on the exchange - rate. 
An important characteristic of the Chilean experience has been 
the Central Bank's access to the domestic financial market in order 
to sterilize the effects of the accumulation of reserves, which 
tripled between 1989 and 1993.12 The domestic financial market had 
developed on the basis of a reform of the pension scheme (Uthoff, 
1993) . This development of the capital market has allowed the 
Central Bank to sell large volumes of promissory notes, mainly with 
the object of sterilizing the expansion of liquidity resulting from 
the purchases of foreign exchange. 
b) The case of Mexico. From 1983 onwards, the strategy 
followed in Mexico has been based on two lines of action: 
i) macroeconomic adjustment and stabilization of price levels; and 
ii) structural reforms.13 The return to international financial 
markets began in the second half of 1989 and has led to substantial 
surpluses in the capital account of the balance of payments. It has 
enabled the country to tackle growing deficits in current account 
and, at the same time, accumulate international reserves. In this 
context, and in the face of the possibility that capital inflows, 
by its expansive effect on aggregate demand, might prevent the 
inflationary targets from being met, a number of measures aimed at 
reducing the impact of such flows on the domestic economy were 
adopted: i) sterilization of the effect of foreign-exchange 
12 In 1993, these reserves reached the equivalent of one year of imports. 
13 The structural reforms were based, inter alia. on: i) trade 
liberalization; ii) modifications in the regulatory framework for foreign 
investment; iii) privatization of public enterprises; iv) domestic deregulation 
(commercial, industrial, financial); v) strengthening of public finance. 
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operations; ii) relaxation of exchange-rate policy; iii) imposition 
of limits on the levels of external indebtedness of commercial 
banks (Banco de México, 1993; Gurría, 1994). 
At the moment, the exchange-rate policy allows the exchange 
rate to fluctuate within a band, whose maximum point of 
intervention depreciates daily according to a preannounced amount; 
in turn, the lower level of the band remains constant.14 The 
objective of this measure was, on the one hand, to provide greater 
flexibility so that the exchange rate would partially adapt itself 
to the greater supply of capital and, on the other, to extend the 
band so as to increase the exchange-rate risk, in an attempt to 
discourage short-term capital inflows. 
For purposes of monetary policy, this exchange-rate system 
(controlled evolution of the nominal rate) involves an endogenous 
monetary supply determined by variation in domestic credit and the 
balance of payments. Thus, the main instrument of monetary policy 
available to the monetary authorities is to control domestic 
credit, allowing the interest rate to adjust freely to the exchange 
rate (Banco de México, 1993; Guzmán, 1993). 
Open-market operations to sterilize the impact of the capital 
flows have been used with caution. It is estimated that the cost of 
sterilization amounted to 0.25% of GDP during 1990-1992 (Gurría, 
1994) . Side by side with the sterilization and relaxation of 
exchange-rate policy, in 1992 Mexico placed a limit on the 
liabilities in foreign currency of the commercial banks, which is 
now equivalent to 20% of their total assets. The coefficient of 
liquidity requirements was maintained at 15%. 
c) The case of Colombia. During the period 1990-1992, the 
Bank of the Republic of Colombia accumulated international reserves 
until they practically doubled the original balance.15 There is 
now a degree of consensus among analysts that the bulk of the 
increase in the reserve stock was a result of capital inflows and 
not, as on previous occasions, of movements linked to exports 
(Carrasquilla, 1993). 
During the first three quarters of 1991, capital inflows were 
accompanied by an active policy of sterilizing the monetary effects 
of reserve accumulation through open-market operations and a 
In November 1991, together with abolishing foreign-exchange controls, 
Mexico widened the band of fluctuation, allowing for a devaluation of the ceiling 
of 20 centavos a day. In October 1992, Mexico extended the devaluation of the 
ceiling to 0.40 thousandths of a new peso per day (equivalent to a devaluation 
of 4.6% a year) . Towards the end of 1993, the difference between the minimum and 
maximum levels would reach 9% {Banco de Mexico, 1993). 
15 In 1990, the reserves were equivalent to 10 months of imports; by 1992, 
they had jumped to 15 months. 
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modification of exchange rate policy, in June of that year, 
designed to support sterilization efforts.16 
By virtue of this change, the Central Bank would no longer pay 
cash for the foreign exchange it buys; instead, it pays with 
exchange certificates (certicambios), non-interest bearing bonds 
denominated in dollars with a maturity period of one year. The 
price for redeeming these bonds in pesos (called the official 
exchange rate) is fixed daily by the Central Bank.17 At the time 
of their issue, certicambios may be sold on the secondary market 
with a discount that fluctuates in a band ranging from 5.5% to 
12.5%. Their price on the secondary market is equivalent to the 
price of the dollar, known as the representative rate. 
This rate fluctuates within a band whose limits are those 
within which the monetary authorities allow the discount on the 
exchange certificates to fluctuate. If the ceiling of the band 
tends to exceed the 12.5% discount, the authorities intervene by 
buying certicambios. so that a greater demand for these 
certificates reduces their discount (Cárdenas, 1993). 
Although the exchange-rate strategy makes it possible to 
spread over time the monetary effects of reserve accumulation, the 
monetary sterilization carried out in this period was intense; it 
is estimated that in 1991 its impact on the quasi-fiscal deficit 
reached values between 0.5% and 1% of GDP (Cárdenas, 1993; IMF, 
1993) . 
After October 1991, efforts were launched to reduce interest 
rates in the domestic financial system. Accordingly, Colombia 
abandoned the policy of active sterilization pursued during the 
first nine months of 1991, and the emphasis of monetary policy was 
gradually shifted towards the steady elimination of the 
differential between the domestic and external rates of interest, 
with the aim of discouraging inflows of speculative capital, even 
at the cost of allowing an increase in the means of payment higher 
than those observed in the previous period. In spite of this 
increase, the rate of inflation declined in 1992 and 1993 
(Carrasquilla, 1993; Garay, 1993). 
16 Other measures to reduce capital inflows were the application, in June 
1991, of a tax of 3% on transactions in foreign exchange generated by personal 
service provided abroad and on other types of transfers. In February 1992, the 
Bank of the Republic increased the commission paid for the purchase of foreign 
exchange from 1.5% to 5% (IMF, 1993). 
17 This price does not constitute an exchange rate in the strict sense, 
since it is not applied to a purchase or sale of foreign exchange. Rather, it 
reflects the price of liquidating a paper at the moment when it is due (Cárdenas, 
1993) . 
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In order to support a non-sterilizing monetary policy, the tax 
reform enacted in June 1992 introduced a measure for regulating 
inflows of foreign exchange related to services, as a mechanism to 
influence the entry of capital, while relaxing regulations on 
capital outflows.18 
3. Comparison of results 
Table 4 summarizes some policy outputs for the four selected 
countries. Net capital inflows have been specially important in 
Argentina, Chile and Mexico. They climbed to figures of around' 8% 
of GDP (measured in 1980 dollars). The large inflows in all cases 
were associated with increased deficits on current account, which 
were particularly high in Argentina and Mexico, more moderate in 
Chile, and minor in Colombia. 
Economic activity recovered significantly in all four cases, 
but with varied timing. In Chile and Mexico, economic activity 
touched the production frontier in the late 1980s. Argentina was 
operating with a large underutilization of capacity by that time 
and was able in 1991-1993 to sharply increase the use of capacity 
and the level of actual GDP. Colombia, the country with most 
stable macroeconomic policy, and better performance in the 1980s, 
sustained an actual GDP close to the production frontier. 
Investment also recovered in all cases, but only by a low 
proportion of increased capital inflows. In fact, after 
replenishing reserves, one part of the inflows had to be used to 
finance a widespread worsening of the terms of trade, and other was 
used to finance consumption; in other words, a significant share of 
capital inflows crowded out domestic savings. Only Chile, and 
exclusively in 1993, was able to exceed the investment ratios 
achieved in the early 1980s (and during the 1960s). 
The simultaneous achievement of large capital inflows with 
other economic-policy targets differ among these countries. Efforts 
at price stabilization have been successful and concomitant in 
Argentina and to a lesser extent in Mexico, but have resulted in a 
sticky level of inflation in Chile and Colombia. After peaking to 
the maximum level of their real exchange level, currency has 
appreciated by about 50% in Argentina, 23% in Mexico, and 15% in 
18 In January 1992, all exporters were allowed to keep part of their 
foreign-exchange earnings abroad; formerly, this was only permitted to State 
enterprises exporting oil and minerals, and to exporters of coffee; moreover, 
residents were allowed to keep abroad assets up to a total of US$ 500,000 without 
prior permission. In February 1992, Colombia reduced to one year the minimum term 
for maturity of external loans, which was five years. Thase loans are permitted 
only if their object is to finance working capital and fixed investment (IMF, 
1993) . 
15 
Colombia, but has remained relatively stable in Chile. Finally, 
external equilibria, measured by trends in the non-financial 
current account balance, show rapid and sharp deteriorations in 
Argentina and Mexico, whereas they are moderate in the cases of 
Chile and Colombia. 
From the experience of the countries reviewed above it may be 
concluded, in general, that in those countries where new inflows of 
capital towards Latin America since the 1990s have been large they 
also allowed for the revitalization of economic growth. These 
developments have taken place in macroeconomic contexts that are 
relatively more stable than those of the previous decade. This is 
reflected in the noteworthy deceleration in the rate of inflation. 
Both in the countries reviewed and in the region as a whole 
there are significant trends towards currency appreciation and 
growing deficits in the non-financial and total current accounts. 
However, countries that have opted for moderate sterilization or 
non-sterilized intervention tend to show more marked appreciations 
in the exchange rate, greater increases in the deficit on current 
account, reductions or moderate increases in national savings and 
successes in combating inflation. 
Those countries that have adopted active policies of 
intervention tend to show increases in the levels of national 
savings, a lesser trend towards exchange-rate appreciation, 
together with relatively smaller deficits on current account. The 
reduction in the rate of inflation has tended to be more moderate 
than in the previous cases. 
Experience in the region, in particular during the last decade 
and a half, teaches that one of the main requirements for ensuring 
that capital inflows will boost medium-term and long-term growth is 
that the countries maintain macroeconomic stability, which supports 
efforts to change production patterns and improve international 
competitiveness. In this sense, success of economic policy must be 
measured in terms of the capacity to attain simultaneously the 
permanence of foreign capital flows towards the country over time, 
the maintenance of a certain control over the exchange rate and 
monetary policy and an increase in national savings and investment, 
elements which must expand and enhance the productive base —of 
tradable and non-tradable items— and international competitivity. 
For this purpose, a careful degree of sterilized intervention 
and regulation of the short-term capital inflows are required. The 
recent experiences that have been analysed bring out the importance 
of having instruments that can be adapted with flexibility and 
rapidly to changing conjunctures. The objective is to ensure that 
such instruments allow the authorities to maintain a satisfactory 
balance among regulations designed to: i) isolate the money and 
foreign-exchange markets from speculative short-term international 
capital movements; ii) allow for the management of monetary policy 
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when capital inflows lead to changes in the monetary base that 
generate excess demand; iii) discourage the outflow of capital 
towards international markets in periods of binding external 
constraints, neutralizing the effects of conjunctural factors that 
do not respond to medium- and long-term trends; and iv) equalize 
the cost of access to foreign capital so as to avoid the debt 
overhang of the private and/or public sectors and the possible 
emergence of destabilizing bubbles. 
However, there also are risks if countries opt for the 
intervention alternative. Excessive restrictions must be avoided 
because: i) the overabundance of regulations causes uncertainty, 
which generally discourages productive innovation; ii) regulations 
which persistently go against market forces end up by being 
infringed and lead to the emergence of parallel markets; iii) if 
the norms are overly restrictive, they also limit the range of 
risk, liquidity and terms available to creditors and debtors; 
iv) they reduce the opportunities available to financial 
institutions with an international orientation; and v) they may 
limit economic growth by cutting the country off from major 
possibilities for long-term financing and for compensating 
transitory shocks. 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The region's renewed access to international financial markets 
offers an opportunity to supplement domestic saving in order to 
meet the requirements of changing production patterns with social 
equity. It is especially important to promote investments that 
enhance the competitiveness of the region's economies and the 
well-being of its population. 
From a public policy standpoint, the ideal solution would be 
to separate the permanent components of capital inflows from the 
temporary ones. If there is a permanent flow, such related 
phenomena as real exchange-rate appreciation, growth of the current 
account deficit and increased consumption could be interpreted as 
stabilizing adjustments and, therefore, economically healthy. If, 
on the other hand, capital flows are temporary, the aforesaid 
movements in key variables would be distortionary, since they would 
create economic imbalances and the likelihood of disruptive future 
adjustments with a high social cost. This distinction is, of 
course, very difficult to make in practice. However, there are 
economic-policy measures which can have a differentiated impact on 
short- and long-term flows or on flows of productive as opposed to 
purely financial investment. 
Since capital flows can affect, and are affected by, national 
economic variables, Governments should exercise caution on two 
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fronts. First, they should avoid a situation where capital inflows 
create atypical values or major distortions in key national 
economic indicators, such as real exchange rates, domestic interest 
rates, sectoral indebtedness, inflation (including asset prices), 
consumption, investment and the production of non-tradables. 
Second, Governments should guard against using foreign capital 
inflows as their main instrument for achieving a rigid or extreme 
target for a single domestic economic variable (for instance, the 
exchange-rate anchor for domestic inflation), especially over a 
prolonged period of time. Doing so could throw other important 
variables out of balance, thereby affecting the very instrument 
they tried to use in the first place, namely, capital inflows. 
Capital inflows have had the effect of lifting external 
restrictions on growth and offers the opportunity to obtain 
financing both for reactivating economies and for maintaining the 
investment necessary for sustained and sustainable growth. To seize 
this opportunity, action must be taken on two fronts related to 
financial policy: i) the interaction of financial policy with 
macroeconomic policy to create a stable economic environment, with 
suitable incentives for economic agents, and ii) the interaction of 
financial policy with domestic capital markets, to supplement 
national savings efforts and match them to investment needs. 
Promoting a strategy of sustained growth requires, at the 
strictly macroeconomic level, efforts to manage aggregate demand 
and its composition. The instruments available for this purpose are 
fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate policies. In the absence of an 
active fiscal policy, these instruments are reduced to 
simultaneously controlling the real interest rate (as a monetary 
policy instrument to regulate aggregate domestic expenditure) and 
the real exchange rate (as a trade policy instrument to promote the 
production of tradables and influence the composition of aggregate 
expenditure). 
A conflict arises when an interest rate consistent with the 
objective of curbing inflation and stabilizing economic activity 
(by sterilizing the monetary effects of accumulating reserves) is 
higher than the international rate, adjusted for expectations of 
devaluation, thereby providing an incentive for the inflow of 
capital and promoting exchange-rate appreciation, thus jeopardizing 
the objective of protecting the economy's tradeable sector. If real 
domestic interest rates are allowed to fall, both objectives are 
thwarted, since the higher expenditure induced by lower interest 
rates would put pressure on prices and boost the current account 
deficit, threatening to cause an unsustainable macroeconomic 
imbalance. The authorities can resolve this conflict by acting 
directly or indirectly on capital flows, as Chile has been doing 
systematically, and Colombia and Mexico partially, in the 1990s. 
18 
When the authorities are faced with an unexpected abundance of 
external financing that they consider to be partly transitory or as 
flowing too fast for the economy to absorb, they can intervene at 
three levels. At the first level, they can act to moderate this 
inflow's impact on the exchange rate through the purchase of 
foreign exchange (i.e., accumulating reserves) by the central bank. 
At the second level, they can adopt sterilization policies to 
mitigate the monetary impact of the accumulation of reserves at the 
first level of intervention. At the third level, they can establish 
surcharges or quantitative controls to regulate inflows of capital, 
thereby influencing the composition and volume, the aim being to 
encourage flows whose volume is consistent with the domestic 
capacity to absorb them, channelling them into productive 
investment projects, and, conversely, discouraging the entry of 
short-term speculative capital. 
Since most countries in the region have at some point opted 
for sterilized intervention, they have faced serious conflicts 
between exchange-rate and monetary management. To moderate such 
conflicts, they have used complementary measures, such as providing 
for a degree of flexibility in fiscal policy to regulate aggregate 
demand; stabilization funds for the main export products to soften 
shocks in their price cycles (as in the case of Chilean copper and 
Colombian coffee), and income policies to adapt the relative prices 
of factors to changes in productivity (as in Chile and Mexico). 
Measures intended to change the volume and composition of 
capital flows, giving priority to long-term flows include 
incentives (reserve requirements or taxes, and exchange-rate 
measures that generate more uncertainty for short-term capital 
flows) or even quantitative controls. Some direct quantitative 
controls include requirements as to minimum maturity periods; 
minimum volumes for bond issues, and regulations on the 
participation of foreign capital in the stock market. 
In the area of exchange-rate management, the aim is not only 
to lessen trends towards real appreciation but also to discourage 
international interest rate arbitrage, particularly by increasing 
uncertainty as to short-term trends in currency prices through 
mechanisms that give the authorities a wider margin for 
intervention. For example, one option is to allow "dirty" floating 
within a pre-established band, in relation to a reference value for 
the currency which has been fixed according to the market 
conditions of the different trading partners. 
Fiscal flexibility may include, for instance, variable rates 
of some taxes and contributions to social security, such as of the 
value added tax and obligatory savings in pension funds. The 
Government could be given the authority to change these rates in 
determined recessive or expansive conjunctures. In that way, 
monetary and exchange-rate policies could be complemented with 
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compensatory fiscal policies, thus distributing the adjustment 
among a more balanced set of variables. 
In the current circumstances of abundant external funds and 
comparatively low international interest rates, the use of 
third-level intervention policies, compensatory fiscal management, 
and sterilized intervention help to prevent excess expenditure 
(especially private spending). In that way, it forestalls 
artificial and temporary increases in domestic spending, which 
could cause severe declines in national savings and excessive 
increases in external liabilities, without a corresponding rise in 
the capacity to produce tradables. 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET CAPITAL FLOWS 











1990 1991 1992 1993b' 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.2 2.8 4 2 4 5 4 6 2,8 1 2 1 7 3.3 4.8 4.9 
Oil-exporting countries 1.0 2.S 3 7 4.6 4.3 1.2 0.2 2 1 5.9 6.3 7 1 
Bolivia 3.9 2.4 2.9 7.1 13.1 8.8 6.0 7.8 9.0 14.9 14.9 
Colombia 0.8 4.0 2.4 3.4 5.4 5.4 2.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 4.3 
Ecuador 1.3 6.1 3.6 7.3 4.9 6.8 4.7 5.5 6.8 1.1 8.0 
Mexico 1.7 2.6 4.2 5.1 6.5 1.7 -0.4 4.4 7.6 7.5 8.3 
Peru 2.4 2.1 7.6 4.5 4.9 6.7 4.2 4.9 6.5 7.3 5.9 
Venezuela -0.8 0.9 1.0 2.9 -6.1 -5.8 -3.0 -11.2 0.9 3.9 3.0 
Non-oil-exporting countries l l l l l i 3.0 4.6 4.5 4.8 4.0 1.9 1 4 1.7 3.8 3.4 
South America l l l l l isi 2 5 4.1 4 1 4.4 3 5 1 4 1.1 1.2 3 5 3 1 
Argentina 0.7 0.4 0.4 2.0 1.3 2.5 2.5 -0.8 1.8 5.0 4.1 
Brazil 1.0 3.6 5.5 4.1 4.4 3.8 0.7 1.0 0.4 2.1 2.0 
Chile 2.0 2.0 2.3 12.7 16.2 4.3 6.5 10.2 4.2 8.6 6.4 
Paraguay 2.7 4.5 6.8 10.2 8.5 6.2 5.4 7.7 13.0 6.9 9.6 
Uruguay 2.1 0.4 3.6 6.2 4.3 -1.6 1.7 1.4 1.4 2.0 4.7 
Central America and 
the Caribbean l l l l l i 8.7 10.5 9.2 10.3 10.6 7.6 6 5 9.6 9 1 8 0 
Costa Rica 4.0 9.0 11.8 12.7 13.3 16.1 10.3 6.3 9.0 8.8 7.1 
El Salvador 0.5 1.8 6.4 2.1 6.5 5.8 6.2 9.7 4.9 7.5 6.6 
Guatemala 2.2 2.4 4.7 2.7 3.2 4.1 4.6 2.6 7.7 6.8 7.6 
Haiti 4.4 21.6 13.5 20.3 15.0 14.1 11.5 8.3 4.4 5.9 
Honduras 2.3 5.1 12.3 9.7 8.8 6.0 8.1 10.4 12.1 10.0 8.5 
Nicaragua 5.8 7.2 11.3 11.0 29.7 21.2 34.4 29.8 58.7 62.1 42.0 
Panama 7.7 6.9 11.4 8.0 -1.3 3.2 -6.0 7.4 9.4 6.6 5.7 
Dominican Republic 0.6 6.0 4.8 7.8 7.7 5.7 5.3 0.9 5.4 5.5 5.4 
Source: ECLAC, "Postwar Transfer of Resources Abroad by Latin America", (LC/G.1657-P), Cuadernos de la CEPAL 
N° 67, Santiago, Chile, 1992. United Nations publication, Sales No. E. 91.Ü.G.9, and updated with estimates 
prepared by the Statistics and Economic Projections Division on the basis of official data as of 8/94. 
a/ The estimates of gross domestic product in current dollars were obtained on the basis of data on GDP in national 
currency and the exchange rate of exports of goods and services, implicit in the IMF Balance of Payments series, 
b/ Preliminary estimates. 
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Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET TRANSFER OF 
RESOURCES a/ 











1990 1991 1992 1993c/ 
Latin America and the Caribbean -0.6 0.7 2.4 1.9 1.1 -2.5 -3.7 -1 4 0 7 2.5 2.5 
Oil-exporting countries -2.2 -0 1 1 8 1 9 1 1 -4 3 -4 7 -Í.4 3.2 3.7 4 5 
Bolivia 3.7 0.3 2.0 1.8 3.5 -7.0 0.9 2.4 4.1 11.2 11.2 
Colombia -0.2 0.8 0.0 1.6 4.0 3.0 -2.2 -5.3 -5.9 -3.7 1.1 
Ecuador -0.9 3.4 0.5 3.2 -0.2 0.3 -4.1 -5.1 -1.9 -5.8 1.6 
Mexico 0.2 0.9 2.0 1.6 2.4 -5.9 -5.6 1.2 5.2 5.4 5.8 
Peru 0.7 0.1 5.7 0.0 0.7 2.6 -0.4 1.9 4.2 5.0 3.8 
Venezuela -9.5 -4.5 0.6 3.3 -5.2 -8.0 -6.7 -12.8 -0.3 1.0 0.0 
Non-oil-exporting countries I l l l i i ! 1.3 2.8 1.9 1.2 -I 2 -3.0 -1.4 - 1 0 1.7 1.3 
South America 0.4 1 2 2.6 1.7 1.0 -1 6 -3 5 -1.6 -1 4 1.5 1.1 
Argentina 0.4 -0.7 -0.6 0.4 -1.9 -4.4 -5.1 -3.9 -0.5 3.4 2.9 
Brazil 0.2 2.5 4.0 1.4 0.7 -0.8 -3.3 -1.4 -2.0 0.2 -0.3 
Chile 0.3 -0.1 -0.9 8.9 11.4 -3.7 -3.3 4.2 -1.2 4.0 3.0 
Paraguay 2.2 2.9 5.0 9.0 8.1 6.7 2.8 7.0 12.2 5.7 8.3 
Uruguay 1.5 -0.7 1.9 5.2 3.6 -3.4 -3.5 -2.4 -0.9 0.4 3.7 
Central America and 
the Caribbean 0.8 2 6 5.0 4.0 5.2 3.8 4.3 2 7 5 9 5 7 5.1 
Costa Rica 1.9 6.8 9.0 7.9 2.0 1.1 2.8 2.1 5.7 5.8 4.5 
El Salvador -0.1 0.8 4.7 0.0 3.5 3.1 3.7 7.4 2.8 5.8 5.0 
Guatemala 1.9 0.5 3.3 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.3 0.0 6.3 5.2 6.6 
Haiti 0.8 5.7 13.5 23.9 22.6 12.4 9.9 6.9 3.9 5.4 
Honduras 0.3 1.8 9.6 4.7 3.4 -1.0 2.4 1.9 3.1 1.4 0.4 
Nicaragua 2.8 3.7 7.6 5.8 22.5 14.6 24.2 16.0 35.9 33.5 18.6 
Dominican Republic -1.2 3.9 1.8 4.0 2.8 1.0 0.3 -1.0 2.9 2.8 3.1 
Source: ECLAC, "Postwar Transfer of Resources Abroad by Latin America", (LC/G.1657-P), Cuadernos de la CEPAL 
N° 67, Santiago, Chile, 1992. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.II.G.9, and updated with estimates 
prepared by the Statistics and Economic Projections Division on the basis of official data as of 8/94. 
a/ The Net transfer of resources equals the net imports of capital (Official unilateral transfers, Short-term and 
long-term capital and Errors and omissions), minus net profits and interest, which include both the interest 
effectively paid and the interest due and unpaid. In this table the negative quantities indicate transfers of resources 
abroad. 
b/ The estimates of gross domestic product in current dollars were obtained on the basis of data on GDP in national 
currency and the exchange rate of exports of goods and services, implicit in the IMF Balance of Payments series, 
c/ Preliminary estimates. 
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: SELECTED INDICATORS 
(Percentages of GDP based on 1980 dollars) 
1976-79 1980-81 1982 1983-89 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Net capital inflows 4.9 4.7 2.6 1.0 2.2 3.7 5.7 5.9 
Changes in reserves 1.6 -0.1 -2.7 0.0 1.4 1.9 2.5 1.9 
External savings 3.4 4.8 5.3 1.0 0.7 1.8 3.2 4.0 
Effect on recovery 
GDP growth (%) 5.3 3.1 -1.2 1.8 0.3 3.8 3.0 3.4 
Goods imports 11.6 12.3 10.2 8.9 10.8 12.2 14.1 14.8 
Gross capital 
formation 
24.1 24.4 20.4 17.0 15.4 16.6 18.1 17.9 
Per capita GDP in 1980 
doI Lars 
1 996 2 000 2 046 1 985 1 966 2 004 2 025 2 057 
Mediim-term effect 
Domestic savings 23.9 23.0 22.8 24.2 23.1 23.0 23.2 23.0 
National savings 20.8 19.5 15.2 16.0 14.7 14.8 14.8 13.8 










goods and services) 
-0.2 -1.4 2.3 7.2 7.7 6.4 5.1 5.1 
Source: ECLAC, estimates prepared by the Statistics and Economic Projections Division, on the basis of official 
data as of 7/94. 
Table 4 
COMPARISON OF RESULTS 
ECONOMIC POLICY OUTPUTS 
(Figures obtained from data in US$ 1980) 
NON-STERILIZED 
INTERVENTION CASES 
STERILIZED INTERVENTION CASES 
ARGENTINA CHILE MEXICO COLOMBIA 
NET INFLOWS OF CAPITAL (% of GDP) 
1983-1989 1.5 4.7 -0.4 2.2 
1990 1.0 7.9 4.7 0.1 
1991 3.3 3.6 8.4 -1.0 
1992 7.4 8.0 8.6 0.6 
RATE OF GROUTH OF GDP (%) 
1980-1989 -1.1 3.3 1.5 4.1 
1990 -0.1 2.0 4.4 4.0 
1991 8.9 5.8 3.6 1.9 
1992 8.6 10.3 2.6 3.6 
1993 6.0 6.0 1.0 4.5 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE (1985=100) 
1989 144.3 133.5 110.4 152.7 
1990 99.0 139.5 107.4 172.5 
1991 85.4 137.6 98.0 173.0 
1992 79.9 131.8 90.7 154.8 
1993 73.8 132.0 85.4 148.3 
CPI INFLATION RATE (%) 
1989 4 923.0 21.4 19.7 26.1 
1990 1 344.0 27.3 29.9 32.4 
1991 84.0 18.7 18.8 26.8 
1992 17.0 12.7 11.9 25.1 
1993 7.7 12.2 8.7 21.2 
INVESTMENT COEFFICIENT (% of GDP) 
1980-1981 23.7 22.2 27.9 20.1 
1983-1989 17.0 14.5 17.0 17.5 
1990 13.3 18.1 18.9 14.9 
1991 15.3 17.4 19.5 14.4 
1992 18.5 20.1 20.7 16.1 
NON FINANCIAL CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (% of GDP) 
1980-1981 -1.4 -7.2 -2.9 -1.9 
1983-1989 7.1 9.3 10.0 2.5 
1990 13.3 9.6 5.2 7.3 
1991 8.2 11.2 3.6 8.4 
1992 3.6 9.2 -0.3 5.9 
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figure 1 
LATIN AMERICA: DOMESTIC AND NATIONAL SAVINGS 
(Pereantagea of GDP) 
Sroirce: On She basis of HCt-AC, Statistics and Kmnnnroc PrnjecSorai [Muslim 
Figure 2 
LATIN AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN 
(Alternative indicators of savings and investment) 
GROSS NATIONAL AND DOMESTIC SAVINGS 
AS PROPORTIONS OF GDP 
YEARS 
- • - gds(o) — g n s - * - gns(o) 
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
AS PROPORTIONS OF GDP 
26 
15 
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YEARS 
- m - gdT(o) — g t f l 
W -J 
gds(o) = Gross domestic savings at constant prices as a proportion of GDP at these prices, 
gns = Gross national savings at current prices as a proportion of GDP at these prices. 
gns(o) = Gross national savings at constant prices as a proportion of GDP at these prices. 
gdi = Gross domestic investment at current prices as a proportion of GDP at these prices. 
gdi(o) = Gross domestic investment at constant prices as a proportion of GDP at these prices. 
Source: G. Held and A. Uthoff, "Indicators and determinants of savings for Latin America and the Caribbean", paper prepared for the Conference on Growth 
and Long-term Development, El Escorial, Madrid, 11-13 July 1994. 
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